The Future Course of Burma

by Htun Aung Gyaw

The NLD, the victorious party in the 1990 election, and the Burmese military regime, Burma's de facto rulers, are heading to a showdown on August 21, 1998, the date that the NLD has given as an ultimatum for convening the parliament.

As August 8th approached, the regime grew very worried about the tenth anniversary of the nationwide demonstration now known as "four eights" (8-8-88). To avoid a repeat of such large-scale uprisings, the SPDC suddenly called a meeting with NLD Chairman U Aung Swe on August 6, a mere two days before the momentous anniversary. This was a trick typical of the Burmese military, who are trying to buy time and give false hope to those who are preparing to strike.

When we look more closely at the meeting called for by the SPDC, it becomes clear that they are still excluding not only Daw Aung San Suu Kyi but also U Tin Oo from these talks. It was not by any means a sincere attempt at dialogue, since neither of the opposition parties have any right to choose whom they wish to send to the meeting. Instead, the military is reserving the right to dictate with whom it will speak. Even though NLD had not mentioned whom they wish to send to talk to the SPDC, the SPDC has always recognized U Aung Shwe and deliberately rejected Aung San Suu Kyi as the voice of the NLD. This time the NLD outright rejected this offer of talks because its members do not believe that the regime has any intention of coming to a lasting agreement with them. Furthermore, the fact that the SPDC has called for talks so soon before the tenth anniversary of nationwide protests against military rule betrays its underhanded strategy; they are not beneath using overtures for peace as a tactic for holding on to their power.

More crucially, both sides have been waiting for August 21st with anxiousness and fear. The SPDC of course fears that Burma will once again be swept by nationwide demonstrations; as for the NLD, it is worried that there will be no large-scale protests on that day and on the days following.

Case A

If, on August 21st, there are no demonstrations as the NLD fears, the NLD must then do something out of the fact that it has set down an ultimatum for convening the parliament. As Aung San Suu Kyi and U Aung Shwe are legally authorized to do so by the NLD's elected representatives, they have the right to form a cabinet if necessary. In the absence of large-scale protests, the NLD might give a formal announcement of who the cabinet members are after the targeted date. Were they to make such an announcement, the NLD cabinet would then become the legitimate government because they have received the mandate from the people. As a result, there would then be two governmental bodies in Burma: the democratically elected government headed by the ASSK and the de facto government of the military junta. The NCGUB, which was formed in the jungle and has recently moved to Australia, will dissolve because it would not be necessary for it to exist once the NLD had formed its cabinet. Such an act would boost the activities of the Burmese communities abroad because the NCGUB has been acting as a toll-keeper for democracy, which has been hindering the establishment of a true democratic political order rather than promoting it.

In 1988, former Prime Minister U Nu formed a parallel government, but the students and other politicians refused give it their formal recognition. By contrast, the NLD has much more of a chance than U Nu's effort; it has a popular mandate and plays an active, leading role in Burmese politics, its leader ASSK is a Nobel laureate who enjoys the respect and esteem of world leaders and international organizations. If, in this scenario, ASSK were not to take a position in the cabinet but were to continue acting as the NLD's party chief, the SPDC would find itself in a sticky predicament. It would then be tremendously difficult for the SPDC to continue to paint her as a power-hungry politician. ASSK will have shown that she cares foremost for the well being of the people, and not for any personal gain. In abiding by her disbarrment from running in the 1990 elections, ASSK will only strengthen her cause as one who seeks to better Burma and not her own interests. The 1988 democratic revolution has turned out many positive results for the people of Burma as well as for the NLD in 1998. Within ten years, the Burmese struggle for democracy has become well known throughout the world and has received the support of international organizations and activists from other countries. The arrest of eighteen international activists in Burma this month has proven that the problem of freedom for Burma is not an issue isolated from the international community. Unlike in 1988, Burmese students and activists are forming their own organizations in Japan, Thailand, Canada, Australia, Norway, Germany, and the United States. They have all been instrumental in rallying support for a democratic Burma.

If the NLD formed its own cabinet, the West and the United States would likely give their support, but authoritarian states such as China and North Korea and semi-democratic countries might wait and see if it will stay in power before giving their recognition. It is possible that China, North Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore will support the SPDC in secret during this critical period. When the democratic government collides with the military regime, the ones to suffer the most will be the Burmese people. Blood will flow on Burmese soil, many will lose their lives. If the SPDC were to arrest the NLD cabinet members, international organizations will come out strongly against the regime, perhaps leading to tough sanctions against Burma. Also, ASEAN will have to respond to this outbreak of political chaos. The SPDC has not strengthened Burma's economy, and Burma's currency remains in free-fall.

Today, the morale of the people and the nation's economic plight are in far worse condition than in 1988. A monk, taking a rest on an automobile trip from Mandalay to Kyauk Sae, relates how he was approached by hungry children who offered to give him and his companions massages in exchange for money. The monk was shocked by the desperateness in the children's eyes, who were forced to go around begging. A businessman, exporting soy and other beans from Burma, relates how his supplier, responding to the demand for fresh green beans, will dye other kinds of beans green for export to various countries. Another common trick of the suppliers is to spray the beans with water and cover them with a layer of dry beans. The wet beans weigh more than dry ones, but they become rotten when they arrive at their destination. The supplies will even place set stones in the middle of sacks in order to make them weigh more. Now, no one wants to order materials and products from Burma. The morale of the people has reached a breaking point. Few have adequate knowledge of business. In most countries, ordering products in greater quantities will drive down the price. In Burma, it is the opposite. If the buyer orders more of something, the seller will try to make a greater profit by raising prices. It is a mentality that causes many in Burma to suffer. Even though the SPDC remains stubbornly attached to its power, economic collapse will bring them down in the near future.

Economic failure and political oppression leads to social unrest. If many lose their lives in the struggle, the responsibility lies at the door not just of the SPDC and the NLD, but also with the United Nations. The UN has been very passive on the Burma issue and also legally recognizes the SPDC as a legitimate government. Recent overtures by the UN Secretary General to send his representative to Burma was turned down by the SPDC. It shows that the UN needs to take a firmer stance against the SPDC's authoritarianism. It is proven that merely issuing a letter of concern is not enough to solve Burma's core problems. The UN must demonstrate its effectiveness in resolving such crises, including that of Burma's political order.

Case B

On August 21st, if there are nationwide demonstrations, as the SPDC fears, the military regime will once again kill unarmed demonstrators like it did in 1988. But whether the army will carry out its orders this time is placed in doubt by the fact that most soldiers below the rank of major are now suffering the problems faced by most of the people of Burma. They know now that the only people benefiting from the regime's corruption are above the rank of colonel. They realize that the country's interests are being blatantly ignored, and that the future of Burma remains quite bleak. They cannot deny any longer that their leadership is corrupt and that the army has been manipulated and misused since 1962. U Aung Gyi, who was close to the military, declared last month that the army is a divided entity. In 1988, we witnessed some units of the army joining the demonstrations. Recent years have seen SLORC's generals Tun Kyi, Kyaw Ba, Myint Aung, and Maung Hla sacked from the army and detained. Their supporters remain in the military and are ready to join the opposition when the opportunity arises. The loyalty of the army to its leaders is uncertain. The SPDC is quite reluctant to put it to the test. Followers of the sacked generals might join the demonstrators for various reasons, whether out of hatred for the regime or the desire for revenge. On this score, the emergence of a Burmese Ramos is possible. Of the 400,000 SPDC troops, if 20,000 were to join the people, then this faction of soldiers backing the "Burmese Ramos" will be supported by people who are fed up with the regime. Rangoon and Mandalay alone will those soldiers have a chance for recruiting hundreds of thousands of civilian supporters. Furthermore, it is likely that more SPDC will defect to the side of the opposition. A full-scale civil war might erupt. To avoid such an awful occurrence, both the NLD and the SPDC need to engage in serious talks about the fate of the country. The UN needs to encourage the SPDC to negotiate, but also put pressure on them to work out an acceptable political solution. If the UN enters as a mediator, the NLD will accept its participation, but the SPDC will only cooperate if it sees a carrot on the end of the international stick. The only way to resolve the Burmese crisis is to initiate talks between the SPDC and the NLD. Otherwise, the country will slip into the appalling destruction of civil war.