The Burmese military regime, State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)/ State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), have played many tricks on the Burmese people and the rest of the world. SPDC said they were going to set up a democratic government but the real intention was only to hold the status quo and grab political power in different clothing -- the same behavior as their predecessor Revolutionary Council/ Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) did in the past, General New Win became President U Ne Win under the1974 constitution which allowed a one party system. General Ne Win shed his army uniform and donned civilian clothing after drafting the new constitution which favored him to become a civilian leader. SPDC is now following the same step.

The pro democracy groups inside the country and living in exile need to speak with one voice what they think about the SPDC's road map. They need to give a set of conditions that if not met, will also not allow the sham of a National convention. Otherwise, with help from ASEAN, especially from Thailand, SPDC will manage to fool again the world community and the Burmese people in general and will survive for decades more.

Under tremendous pressure from the US, the EU, China and their allies from ASEAN countries, SPDC copied an idea from Thailand's road map initiative and declared a seven step road map without a time frame and without mentioning 1990 election results.

NLD and the Burmese exile groups around the world out right rejected the road map idea. The newly emerged group called the Ethnic Nationalities group presented its own road map, called ENSCC road map, with a time frame. They said that they are not opposing Khin Nyunt's road map, instead they added some points lacking in the SPDC's road map. But SPDC ignored ENSCC approach.

Burmese dissident groups rejected the ENSCC road map and argued that the first step to break the dead lock is to start a real dialogue between the NLD and the SPDC. First, before starting a dialogue SPDC should release all political prisoners unconditionally. Second, SPDC must start a dialogue with NLD. Third, when the dialogue is going well and after confidence building has been made, then the ethnic minority groups, NLD and SPDC will start the tripartite dialogue. Many Burmese dissidents believe that without trust within the rival groups there will be no dialogue or negotiation. If SPDC is trying to start a dialogue without building trust with the pro-democracy groups, it will not reach a single agreement for sure. Holding political prisoners as hostages and creating a national convention means nothing but a clear sign of continuation of the repression to the democratic forces by the regime, not a positive step as Thai Prime Minister said.

After the Depeyin massacre, Burmese exile groups have been actively working each other and trying to finds ways to counter any move made by the military. They realized that without collective leadership, their individual or single group attempt to fight against the Burmese military regime will not effective. With this vision thirty-three groups united in the Fort Wayne conference and declared that they did not accept the SPDC's road map on October 13, 2003.

Here is the history of past moves made by the Burmese military regime:

1. SLORC announced that the army would go back to the barracks after the 1990 elections and they had no interest to hold political power. SLORC said who ever wins the election will have the right to rule the country.

2. NLD won in a landslide victory and gained 82% of the parliamentary seats. SLORC refused to hand over the political power.

3. SLORC made an excuse that without an appropriate constitution; they could not transfer political power to the wining party, National League for Democracy.

4. One of the senior leading NLD CEC members, U Kyi Maung, challenged the regime in the Gandhi Hall conference, stating that NLD would use 1947 democratic constitution with little change.

5. SLORC/SPDC captured many of the elected members who demanded for transferring the political power.

6. A one-sided National Convention started in 1992, which was comprised of a few elected members. The rest were hand picked by the regime. There was no time frame of when the new constitution would be done and when the regime will transfer the political power.

7. NLD and SNLD walked out from the NC because of unacceptable guide lines such as:

- The President must have military experience;
- Without entering the election, the military must have 25% of the seats in the parliament;
- The army chief of staff will be the defense minister and he has the right to take over political power under the new constitution, if he thinks the condition of the country warrants it;
- Any person who marries a foreigner cannot not be a leader in Burma.

8. NC adjourned in 1996 without finishing a new constitution and without giving any reason.

9. In 2000, SPDC warmly welcomed Malaysian diplomat Razali Ismil as UN special envoy for Burma and praised him as a fellow Southeast Asian who understood Burma's problems.

10. The regime released 10 to 20 prisoners every time Razali visited Burma and Razali praised the release as a positive step. He frequently gave false hope to the world that dialogue between Aung San Suu Kyi (NLD) and SPDC would start soon.

11. Two years have passed without a single dialogue with the opposition, The SPDC was using the tactic of releasing 10 to 20 political prisoners per month in the beginning. If it still continues, it will take at least ten years to free 1500 political prisoners in Burma. In fact SPDC has been using political prisoners as their leverage to get credit for positive change.

12. On November 22-23, 2002 John Hopkins University's Southeast Asia studies Program hosted a Burma conference called 'Reconciliation in Myanmar and the Cries of Change". In the conference Burmese ambassadors from Britain and the US attended and delivered a message that 'Burma is on the right track but and the democratizing process will be slow and steady'. Burmese activists who attended the conference gave suggestions that reconciliation and confidence building are crucial for democratic change. They said releasing all the political prisoners would definitely give a real hope for change and it is the first step for a reconciliation process.

13. The words "Burma is on the right track" uttered by the Burmese ambassador from Britain evaporated after the Depeyin massacre.

The above points prove that the regime has no credibility, sincerity and willingness to hand over political power.

Now the regime says that in 2004 a National Convention will be held again. Like the previous one there is no time frame with the same unacceptable guidelines. Most of the opposition groups do not buy what the SPDC is selling. But one group, FBC, welcomes the Khin Nyunt initiative. FBC might have good intentions but without giving preconditions for the national convention, supporting the road map is a big mistake.

In addition, rather than giving set conditions to enter the National Convention, FBC said the 'Khin Nyunt road map is on the right track' and it is optimistic that NC would change to a genuine 'national round table talk'. That kind of comment gave the wrong signal. Nobody knew or had the ability to predict if the KN road map was on the right track or if it would lead to a true round table negotiation. We have to look at the beginning of the Khin Nyunt road map initiative in August 2003 and to the present. What positive change does SPDC make within this period' Nothing has improved.

In the Fort Wayne conference all parties rejected the road map including FBC. After the FW conference what improvement have we seen from SPDC' None. We cannot say KNU and SPDC talking is a positive step to support KN's road map because KNU and SPDC are not signing a cease fire agreement yet. The current KNU statement explains the true intention of the SPDC troops in the Karen state, which violated the basic human rights of the Karen people.

FBC is not only wrongly supporting the KN's road map; its pressuring the NLD to enter the NC without acceptable conditions is a second mistake. NLD Central committee member U Nyunt Wai clearly states in his interview with DVB that NLD does not accept KN's road map and expresses disappointment for the FBC statement.

After SPDC appointed General Khin Nyunt as a Prime Minister, he made a bold move; he sent a liaison officer to make a deal with KNU which asked many times to reach a cease fire agreement with the regime. The regime demanded the total surrender, which the KNU never accepted.

With the pressure from the Thais and the 'new' approach from the regime, KNU reached a temporary cease fire agreement. If the two camps signed the cease fire agreement, the opposition groups functioning inside Karen territory will face restrictions for their actions against SPDC including NDF, DAB, ABSDF, NLD (LA), DPNS, NCUB and NCGUB.

Recently, the Thai government did not want UNHCR to help Burmese refugees and wanted to know who got the 'Person of Concern' status recognized by the UNHCR. Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra blocked the proposal from the Thai Interior Ministry to ask UNHCR for Bt 4 million to help Burmese refugees. It was a routine proposal made by the Thai authorities to get money from UNHCR to help Burmese refugees. This move clearly states that the Thaksin government does not want to support Burmese refugees. Instead, he wants to tighten the Burmese pro-democracy movement in Thailand to favor Burmese generals.

What's the scenario of all these changes?



Thailand Foreign Policy on Burma

Under BSPP rule, Thailand's foreign policy was to support the Ethnic resistance groups in Burma and use them as a buffer zone between Thailand and Burma. BSPP's closed door policy boosted the border trade between Thailand and Burma. As a result, ethnic resistance groups such as KNU, MNSP, KNPP, and SSA, stationed along the Thai-Burma border area, had a chance to control border trade with Thailand in their respective areas. Thai politicians, generals and Chamber of Commerce favored the ethnic resistance groups and supported their armed struggle. Ethnic armed resistance groups are beneficial groups for the Thai economy.

But after SLORC/SPDC changed its close door policy to an open one (technically the open economic policy is totally dominated by SPDC elite groups), the Thai government saw it as more beneficial for them to deal with the regime rather than to deal with resistance groups from Burma. The new Thai policy toward Burma is to cooperate with the regime and support them to maintain their political power. On the other hand, they are gradually down grading the relationship between the pro-democracy groups and NGO's, who are helping Burmese refugees. Finally, they are helping the Burmese regime to terminate all resistance groups from the border areas and plan to exploit Burma's rich natural resources without any resistance.

The reasons for the Thai closeness to the Burmese regime are;

1. Current high ranking Thai government officials got lucrative deals with the regime. Thaskin Government is negotiating a cellular phone deal with the Burmese regime.

2. Burma is the main potential country, if it has the chance to become a democratic country, to compete with Thailand in every field. Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam are much smaller and have fewer human and natural resources than Burma. Economically, Burma has rich natural resources. Regarding human resources, Burma has many intellectuals who are willing to work in any field and who have a better command of the English language than Thais in general.

3. Throughout history, Burma has sacked the Thai kingdom twice. The Burmese army has fifty years more civil war experience than Thailand. A strong army of 300,000 is a big threat for Thailand. Thai politicians and generals are more interested in making business than shaping their army. Whenever tension has occurred between the Thai and Burma border, Burma has closed its border trade and the Thais are the one's who try to please their Burmese counterparts to reopen it.

4. Thai government officials are highly corrupt and they do not care about the Burmese people's need for democracy and freedom. They care about their business connection with the Burmese regime. The Thai government's recent move to reject the proposal from the Interior Ministry to the UNHCR for helping Burmese refugees is one indicator that Thais only want to please the current Burmese regime. To continue its business dealings with Burma, the Thai government has to give crucial information to the SPDC regime about who is applying for refugee status and who is granted 'Person of Concern' status. Chavalit Youngchai Yudh, current Deputy Prime Minister and former Army Chief of Staff, forced to send Burmese student activists to Burma from Tak province in 1989. In return, he got a lucrative logging and fishing concession in Burma.



SPDC initiative

KNU is the only strong armed resistance group left at the Thai-Burma border and many pro democracy resistance groups are staying in KNU controlled area. Burmese army rank and file is not happy with the regime. A person with a position in custom check points, border check points, trade centers, gas stations, distribution centers, and gem mines become rich even he is a corporal or a captain. But a person in the front lines suffers from malaria or ambush by resistance groups, even though he may be a colonel or a major.

The soldiers have no way out to leave their units. Now army units are willing to desert and want to see a democratic Burma. If the UNHCR negotiated with the Thai and Indian governments to set up a refugee camp for army deserters, many army units would lay down their arms and enter into the UNHCR protection camps. Burmese generals are seriously concerned about the possibility of this option and made a deal with the Thai and India governments to send back any one from the Burmese army who desert their units.

Another problem for the Burmese regime is the UNHCR has been helping many pro-democracy activists to resettle in third countries as political refugees. Those refugees have become Internet guerillas and they are waking up the sleeping world with their information about the plight of the Burmese people. The best way for the Thai government to please the Burmese regime is to restrict the work of the UNHCR in Thailand and close down refugee camps. At the same time, the Burmese regime has to welcome the KNU into their fold, which will automatically freeze the pro democracy movement in the border region. Willingly or not, KNU has a responsibility to restrict the movement of the pro democracy groups in its area if they have signed the cease-fire agreement.

Suicide bombers are very popular in the Tamil movement and Middle East conflict. Even though we do not like to see any violent means many militant Burmese activists inside the country are considering this option to reach their goals for democracy. A non-violent movement is widely used by both NLD and exile groups because of its world wide acceptance, but the younger generation are not patient enough for this option. They are willing to risk their life for what they believe in by using violent means. Seizing the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok, hijacking planes from Burma and Thailand were an indication of their resentment. SPDC initiative is to kill two birds with one stone; protect the army from dissolving and use KNU as its tool to stop all infiltration inside Burma from both non violent groups and the radical armed resistance groups.



Conclusion

The SPDC road map is intended to buy time and hold on to political power. If the Burmese generals really care about the people and respect their rights, they need to compromise with the National League for Democracy and start a true dialogue without any restrictions. 'National Convention' means attendance by all elected parliamentary members, not just the people hand-picked by the regime. Releasing all political prisoners is the first step to prove that it is a real turning point initiated by the regime.

Pro-democracy groups also need to understand what their roles are and what they need to do to achieve democracy. Exile groups need to know that they are only pressure groups, not the main political actors. Pro-democracy groups outside the country need to work together as a team, not as a self-promoters and proud intellectuals who think they know better than others. That kind of attitude will not only drag them down but will also harm the movement as a whole.

Thaksin government needs to think wealth is not a permanent thing and wealth cannot make the world to become beautiful. The real thing make the world beautiful is peace. If there is no peace in Burma, there will be no peace in Thailand or any of Southeast Asia. Ignoring the Burmese people's choice and supporting the Burmese generals and praising them as peacemakers will damage Thai-Burma relations in the future because Burma will be ruled by the democratic elements, not by the military thugs. ASEAN policy of constructive engagement needs to change to constructive criticism.

Burma is like a sleeping volcano, it will erupt any time, any moment. Unlike the1988 nationwide uprising, the coming storm will be violent. If the military generals ignore the suffering of the Burmese people, mass uprisings will come. This time it will wipe out the military roots from its soil.

Burmese activists need to think about how to support and ignite the uprising. To draw a strategy to invent the popular uprising is crucial. Who will do this' If we are united and know what our roles are, we will make it collectively.

Htun Aung Gyaw